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Abstract: While the financial markets have to face systemic and systematic risks, especially the 
insurance industries, the national supervisory authorities intend to implement regulation systems as 
uniform as possible at regional level and in the same time as conservatory as possible from the point 
of view of the risks accepted. The present paper intends to accurately analyze the regulation systems 
of important insurance markets (as tradition or volume of premiums) – such as RBC, SST, Solvency 
II in order to stress the similarities of these models but more important the differences that generated 
a different rigidity degree of the insurance companies, in other words, a different minimum capital 
requirement. The paper intends to illustrate the financial and organizational impact of the European 
model Solvency has on the insurance companies, through its supplemental requirements, introduced 
by the supervisory authorities as a reaction to the recent financial crises. 
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Along with the development of society, implicitly of the human activities, risks 
have diversified. Therefore, the insurance industry must deal with new exposures 
of their customers and also their own, offering optimal combinations of 
advantageous conditions of risk management. In recent years there has been an 
increase in the number of natural disasters, even if it cannot be clearly demarcated 
how many of them can be the result of human activity and how many are purely 
natural (Insurance Information Institute, 2012). Moreover, in the last twenty years 
there were registered the most costly natural events (Munich Re, 2012) faced by 
humanity, implicitly by the insurance market. 
Positive upward trend in the number of natural disasters has important 
implications for insurance market. But not the number of those, but the severity of 
phenomena affecting insurance companies who lose out increasingly large - 
according to the Insurance Information Institute, only in 2005 - the year of 
hurricanes, there have been recorded insured losses worth 64 billion USD. Events 
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such as earthquakes, affecting alone or along with large tsunami , habitable surface 
(see the example of Japan, Sumerians, Chile) or flooding due to storms / hurricanes 
(USA, Cuba) emphasized the impact that a catastrophic event - is considered 
catastrophic an event resulting in losses greater than 25 million USD - has on the 
insurance market, and indirectly on the reinsurance market. Insurers seek solutions 
to protect against geographical concentration of policies or risks (through their 
exclusion from the general conditions) to meet claims from their clients. 
Based on these circumstances, we cannot draw only one conclusion: the insurance 
market was not ready for events of this magnitude, they ignored them 
considering that the probability is almost zero. Our world is evolving, environment 
constantly changes, which inevitably exposes us to risks becoming more diverse, 
with high degree of correlation with effects becoming more expensive for 
insurance companies. The examples presented above are illustrations of some 
causes of insurance market failures that have significant effects on the reinsurance 
market as a result of active financing contracts, under pressure from significant 
damage. 
These events were just some of the factors that led to the need to implement a good 
surveillance system, in order to reduce the adverse consequences of end users, that 
experience such events. The reaction of the insurers was prompt in face of the 
disastrous effects, realizing that a second experience of high magnitude would 
not allow them to survive in the market; thus, they changed the policy conditions 
and also changed the list of excluded events. However, each time a new exposure 
(an event plausible but still untried) hit the final consumers and brought substantial 
losses for insurers, surprising them again. Such moments cannot be avoided or 
predicted, the only feasible solution for insurance companies is to implement a 
system that does not exhibit a high degree of risk associated with extreme nature 
events, geopolitical interests that may lead to terrorist attacks or economic crisis 
world. 
Worldwide, the insurance market is divided according to the level of development 
of each country. Thus, the market is divided in developed countries, where the 
insurance market is mature and developing countries that have a high potential for 
development - the past 10 years, the annual growth rate in these markets was 11%, 
with the more surprising as on developed markets, the growth rate was 1.3% 
(Swiss Re a, 2011). 
The insurance market, as any item that fits into the market economy system, is 
heavily influenced by developments in the economic environment, particularly by 
the macro-economic indicators such as gross domestic product, the development by 
regions of economic activity, population density. Macro-economic indicators are 
influencing factors that insurance companies cannot control, but for which they can 
implement measures to reduce losses in times of recession. Overall economic 
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developments affect insurance markets in different proportions, depending on 
the degree of development of the insurance market in the total market. The more 
developed the insurance market is, the greater the exposure to insurance companies 
in adverse economic conditions, due to the degree of inter-relationship of the 
insurance industry with other sectors of the economy (banks, real estate, capital 
market). An example of this is the propensity of  the  insurers to invest in financial 
instruments with a high rate of profitability that have associated high risk in order 
to make their products more attractive - a favorable decision under economic boom 
but generating significant risks during periods of economic instability. 
The chain of economic crisis in 2008 brought a new challenge for financial 
markets, strongly shaken by bankruptcies of banks and reduction of liquidity. 
One of the consequences was an intensification of supervision (Swiss Re b, 2011) 
from the regulatory authorities - considered negligent in preventing the shock 
created by the financial crisis. In this regard, the authorities have focused on 
increasing the degree of supervision, imposing new rules and basic parameters of 
the global financial and economic systems. In many ways, understanding and 
acceptance of the overall system of risks, implicitly of the systemic risk, is new, 
but for the first time since 2008 we have seen how strongly related are the financial 
markets. 
Despite the crisis induced by the banking sector, insurers and reinsurers were found 
themselves in the process of attack by the regulators who intentionally applied a 
brutal cutting exposures related to the banking system (Liedtke, 2010) - there were 
companies like AIG that beyond the investment banking division, failed on 
insurance market because of its investment portfolio (Dinallo, 2010). Despite the 
lack of bankruptcy cases, however, in the whirl of events, insurance supervisory 
system was alarmed and the result was rather dramatic and disproportionate. 
Moreover, due to the banking crisis, interest rates decreased, thus affecting 
investment of  insurance companies (a decrease of 1% in interest rates led to a cost 
of 220 billion Euros a year (Swiss Re b, 2011). A major difference between 
banking and insurance industry is that a company's bankruptcy (caused by liquidity 
problems) will not create liquidity problems on other market players - on the 
contrary, other insurance companies will take the missing portfolio, thereby 
protecting the end user.  
The regulators are the ones setting the legal framework for insurers to operate 
safely, the latest financial crisis highlighting the importance of international 
regulatory cooperation, especially for financial groups. Currently there are many 
initiatives that act as drivers of reforms to the prudential supervision. Besides 
World Bank and IMF, another body concerned with improving national financial 
systems and international vulnerability reduction is the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) that approved in 2010 to develop a common legal 
framework (CRO Forum a, 2009) necessary for the monitoring process of 
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internationally active groups and also created an initiative concerning the 
collaboration of supervisory colleges at international level. 
Beyond the benefits brought by the solvency regimes imposed by regulators, 
attention should be paid to the lack of communication between the regulator and 
the insurance market which can lead to inefficient additional requirements, such as 
stress tests imposed by the FSA in the UK in 2001 and 2002 revealed - the tests led 
to the forced sale of assets, capital market conditions worsening, leading to low 
corporate value. Moreover, it must be beared in mind that a system that will  be 
implemented across multiple unitary national markets (such as Solvency II) need 
well calibration, in other words, to take account of specific market conditions, 
following the implementation phase, in order not to create significant imbalances in 
the market value of the companies that operate under uniform rules. 
 
Diversity of Risk-Based Regimes in Insurance Industry 
At the time of writing this paper, we identify global application of several types of 
prudential systems - fixed- rate model (the European markets still apply Solvency 
I), risk-based model (RBC model applied in the U.S. and Canada) and internal 
model (Switzerland). The simplest model assumes a single risk quantification; 
simplicity of design is reflected by the limited results obtained from this 
evaluation, which is why this model (Solvency I) is about to be replaced by a more 
complex model.  
As a consequence of limitations due to fixed-rate model and also in the context of 
economic and financial changes, it was obvious the need to implement a more 
complex model that reflects the complexity of the interrelationship between risks. 
Examples of such models which include more risks so that solvency requirements 
will better reflect threats in the insurance system are the RBC model and the SST 
model. 
But the model that best reflects the multitude of risks faced by insurance 
companies and that pursues their custom detailed quantification and 
interdependencies between risks is the internal company model. Starting from 
their own historical data and based on forecasts specific to each insurance 
company, models can be developed so that they reflect actual exposures of an 
insurer, according to the risk profile and its activity. 
The Solvency II directive proposes a standard model for calculating the 
solvency that falls in the category of systems based on more risk quantification. 
Like the SST, Solvency II enables developers and even support their own internal 
models approved by regulators, which should be within the typology of detailed 
models that quantify risks and their interdependencies. The European and Swiss 
prudential systems share the same foundation, based on working principles. Both 
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models provide risk-based capital requirements, taking into account the market 
value of balance sheet items. Furthermore, both models support a stronger internal 
risk culture and allow regulators to respond in a flexible manner to changes of 
external circumstances. Lastly, Solvency II and SST introduce the concept of group 
supervision by a dedicated group supervisor (CRO Forum a, 2009) - Solvency II 
will explain in detail how the cooperation between supervisors will be performed. 
Swiss Solvency Test (SST) is the first circulating regulatory regime that sets an 
economic model for assessing the risk-based capital and is the precursor to the 
European Solvency II regime. Supervisory activity in Switzerland is an illustration 
of the regulatory regimes of the new generation (Dacorogna & Keller, 2009), 
based on principles and consulting services, with a strong perspective on group 
solvency. 
U.S. regulatory system is based on a combination of approaches based on rules 
and principles, when it comes to evaluating assets and liabilities. According to 
RBC rules-based regime, concrete methods of calculating solvency requirements 
are clearly defined, insurers are required to hold sufficient capital to cover at least 
the RBC. Calculating these requirements quantifies asset risk, credit risk, 
underwriting risk, the risk arising from subsidiaries. NAIC latest trend is to 
include and evaluate the group's solvency and group supervision, given the success 
of SST regime. 
Most regimes prohibit insurance companies to engage in the management of 
speculative derivatives. As a general rule, in a group, only banks or brokers or 
other entities (excluding insurance company) are entitled to use speculative 
derivatives. Speculative derivative activities related to a component of the group, 
whether or not regulated, are included in the group capital requirements. Moreover, 
the regulatory authority has the right to intervene through discretionary capital 
requirements, if not enough sufficient risk capital is used to ensure the solvency. 
SST calculation will take into account derivative activity of non-insurance items in 
the calculation of consolidated or enterprise level within the group. Moreover, this 
activity is required to be presented separately in the report to the regulatory 
authority. In the U.S. RBC model does not include the area of monitoring activities 
related to derivatives held by a non-insurance entity within a group (NAIC, 2009).  
Another aspect illustrating the differences between supervision arrangements relate 
to mismanagement of short-term funding sources to cope with the liquidity 
risk. Solvency II regime is not including specific quantitative requirements for 
liquidity risk (CRO Forum b, 2009), regardless of the activity it generates. In order 
to address liquidity risk, the available capital is less relevant than the liquidity of 
capital available - companies must implement a process for liquidity risk 
management (EC, 2009). If the insurer does not ensure implementation of liquidity 
risk management, the regulator has several options, including imposing additional 
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capital requirement. Sketches lately stress the distinct need to introduce 
contingency plans (CEIOPS, 2009) on liquidity risk to be reported at regular 
intervals by the board of directors of the insurance company / group. Similar to 
Solvency II regime, SST seeks capital rather focus on liquidity risk through 
quantitative requirements. Nevertheless, all insurance companies must develop 
adequate systems of risk management and internal control and reporting any 
change in risk profile. In the U.S., states supervision authorities focus on proper 
analysis of assets, with a review of liquidity risk management practices by 
regulated examinations, questionnaires and surveys, as well as models of stress on 
liquidity (NAIC, 2009).  
The evaluation of assets and liabilities taken into consideration in the solvency 
computation represent another difference of the supervision According to RBC, 
balance sheet items are measured under accounting rules, taking into account 
historical cost. On the other hand, Solvency II proposes the valuation of assets and 
liabilities based on market conditions to better reflect the  real value. 
Concerning the internal model, the RBC does not allow insurance companies to 
develop their own internal models for solvency that meet the needs of each insurer 
(The Joint Forum, 2010). Solvency II accepts and even encourages insurance 
companies to develop custom internal models and also to establish the specific risk 
profile of the insurance business, subject to approval by the regulatory authority. 
 
Impact of Solvency II over the European Insurance Market 
Solvency II is bringing the risk-based supervision process to a new level - besides 
establishing a capital adequacy for the insurance companies, the regime is looking 
for methods of influencing corporate behavior and decision making 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012). The challenge for this regime is to establish a 
common ground for different markets, when discussing practical actions to be 
implemented in highly volatile economic circumstances. The difficulty of 
everyone's agreement and enacting the new procedures can be stressed from the 
methodic postponing of the process - nowadays, the target date is early 2014, 
with a remote possibility of introducing the obligation of it with 2015, in spite of 
the side effects brought by another year of discussions and changes. 
Diversification of the portfolio is expected to become an important part of the 
capital requirements in order to reduce the capital burden by almost 35% - this 
solely can be done by using an internal model by each insurer, whose benefit will 
be to maximize the value of diversification (this due to the fact that the standard 
model does not provide a significant the flexibility needed by a financial 
institution. The diversification will be advantageous primarily to the composite 
insurers (as the degree of correlation between life and non-life risks is rather low) 
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and to the reinsurance companies -the diversification is even more potent in their 
strategies. 
One evident effect of Solvency will be the increase in the number of mergers 
and acquisitions of insurance companies (Clifford Chance, 2011), either as a 
way to raise the capital required by the regime or as a way to change their 
operational models in order to reach the best possible risk profile generated by 
applying the group-based approach of solvency model. Another reason for the 
mergers and acquisitions will be the huge IT costs - concerning implementing and 
maintaining the internal risk-based model - as the prospect of “acquiring” such 
system through a merger might prove to be easier and cheaper than the actual 
purchase of a new system. 
The tradeoff between the expected return on investment of their portfolio and the 
cost of capital need to cover the risk of investment will be determinant in choosing 
the type of investments the insurance company will seek out in order to comply 
with the risk profile set from the beginning. Such procedures will definitely cause 
an increase in the price of low-risk assets such as fixed income securities, 
especially on financial markets with low liquidity and also a corresponding impact 
on the long-term securities (used mostly by the life insurance companies). 
Tailor-made reinsurance solutions may be sought by market participants to 
ensure effective risk management and reduction in required capital levels. 
Therefore, proportional reinsurance treaties are excellent for reducing the 
concentration degree of the insurer's portfolio, which in turns will extend the 
capacity to write other lines of business. Non-proportional treaties can be used in 
order to reduce the volatility of claims generated by the associated capital charges, 
while aggregate excess of loss contracts are perfect for limiting the frequency of 
claims, as they will bring about additional capital relief. Additional forms of 
alternative risk transfer mechanisms will also emerge as Solvency II unfolds. 
The impact of these may need to be tested and approved, and the level of risk 
reduction they offer will be subject to regulatory approval. 
The insurance companies are facing significant costs related to human capital in 
order to implement Solvency II regime - European Commission forecast was 3 
billion euro of the total cost of implementation (European Commission, 2007). 
Introduction of the directive required and continues to produce at the time of this 
paper, significant employee training efforts, thus increased training costs. In 
addition, important costs are generated by investment in computer technology - 
almost half of the total cost- (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010), as the methodology 
of Solvency II calculation implies the existence of an information system able to 
generate high-quality results for the company. Finally, companies are faced with 
the costs of collecting data required for calculation of capital requirements 
(Minimum Capital Requirement and Solvency Capital Requirement) - given a 
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rudimentary data collection process that existed before the introduction of the 
Directive and a lack of consistent data on insurance; for example, the Romanian 
companies in this period bear the burden of implementing appropriate systems for 
collecting and processing historical data (thus understanding information systems 
costs, human resources training costs involved in the process at all levels of the 
company). 
In addition, adoption of Solvency II will result in additional costs to shareholders 
of insurance companies, in order to meet the new solvency requirements. Despite 
high levels of expenditure arising from the implementation of Solvency II, the 
major European insurers consider that the financial efforts required to comply with 
the new regulations are justified - an example in this respect is the reduced effects 
of the financial crisis had on the insurance industry, enough previously capitalized. 
According to a survey conducted in 2008 involving 44 large insurance companies 
in Europe, 43% of them expected to spend less than 5 million euro related to 
capital requirements (Accenture, 2008). For a third of the companies that 
participated in the study, estimates of the costs imposed by the transition to 
Solvency II fell between 5 million and 25 million euro. 
However, these costs are supported by shareholders of insurance companies who 
are convinced that the implementation of the new regime will increase the risk 
control and also will bring about a consolidation of their companies. On the other 
hand, in 2011, there were voices among European insurers, that the regime 
required maintaining excessive and unnecessary levels of capital inside insurance 
companies. 
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